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European Central Bank working paper series 41Abstract
This paper investigates ﬁscal sustainability in an overlapping generations
economy with endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through
educational spending. We assess how budgetary imbalances aﬀect economic dy-
namics and the outlook for economic growth, thereby providing a rationale for
ﬁscal rules ensuring sustainability. Our results show that the appropriate re-
sponse of ﬁscal policy to temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of ﬁscal
rules. Fiscal rules allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding possibly disrup-
tive ﬁscal adjustment in the future: the more adjustment is delayed, the larger
is its necessary scale. We perform a rough calibration of the model to simulate
the eﬀects of a demographic shock (change in the population growth rate) under
diﬀerent ﬁscal policy scenarios.
JEL classiﬁcation: E62, H63, H55, O41, E17
Keywords: Fiscal sustainability, public debt, overlapping generations
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This paper investigates the implications of budgetary imbalances and unde-
sirable debt dynamics for ﬁscal sustainability in a model where both interest
rates and economic growth are aﬀected by ﬁscal developments. A sustainable
ﬁscal policy plan is compatible with the existence of an intertemporal equilib-
rium in every period; this in turn ensures that over time the government will be
able to honor its payments without leading the economy to a catastrophe. Such
a situation may occur in an economy where the ﬁnancing of government debt
fully crowds out physical capital, thereby leading to a disruption of productive
activities.
A theoretical model aimed at a sustainability analysis needs to capture the
impact of ﬁscal policy on economic developments. The overlapping generations
model is suitable for that purpose, since government bonds crowd out physical
capital in the absence of altruistically motivated bequests. The baseline model
is here enriched with two elements. First, human capital formation, which is
ﬁnanced out of parental altruism, is the engine of growth and allows us to also
account for the impact of ﬁscal policy on growth. Second, the public sector
is fully speciﬁed. Both lump-sum and proportional taxes are levied to ﬁnance
lump-sum pension beneﬁts and government consumption. When the govern-
ment revenue is not enough to cover public spending, the government issues
public debt on which it has to pay interests in subsequent periods.
In the absence of ﬁscal rules stabilizing government debt, the economic equi-
librium is in general unstable and unpleasant debt dynamics can lead the econ-
omy to an unsustainable situation. This is the case when the rate of interest
exceeds the economic growth rate - a reasonable assumption. In such a situation
an increase in the debt ratio results in an increase in the interest expenditure
ratio, which in absence of tax increases or expenditure cuts has to be ﬁnanced
by borrowing, ultimately leading to a further increase in the debt ratio and en-
dangering ﬁscal sustainability. The stabilization of the debt ratio in this model
can be achieved by means of a simple ﬁscal rule, whereby for example the gov-
ernment’s target is a constant debt ratio.
The savings of the economy are split between ﬁnancing next period physical
capital and the amount of public debt set in circulation by the government.
As a result, issuing public debt reduces the capital level in the next period
so that both the growth and the interest rate are aﬀe c t e d( l o w e rg r o w t ha n d
higher interest rate). On the other hand, issuing public debt allows the current
generation to enjoy higher levels of consumption that it would obtain were the
government supposed to balance its budget every period. The current generation
can also spend more on their children education, which has a positive eﬀect on
the growth rate through human capital accumulation. This trade-oﬀ generated
by government debt is perfectly reﬂected in our model since both the growth rate
and the interest rate are endogenously determined inside it. This is the main
contribution with respect to other existing models in the literature since the
diﬀerence between the interest and the growth rate of an economy are the key
variables in determining whether a level of public debt can be made sustainable
and both are jointly determined here in a general equilibrium setting.
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in population the European Union is projected to have in the next ﬁfty years, we
show how, starting from equilibrium, a change in the conditions of the economy
(population growth rate in this case) can lead to an unsustainable situation
unless ﬁscal policies are changed in response. In the example, we start from
an equilibrium with a yearly growth rate of 1.85% and a yearly interest rate of
4.73%. The reduction in the population growth rate leads the economy to crash
in ﬁve periods (here, approximately 150 years). However, when ﬁscal rules are
in place, they keep the economy in a sustainable situation, leading ultimately
to a new equilibrium in which the growth rate increases to 2.14% whereas the
interest rate decreases to 4.59%. In addition, ﬁscal rules ensure a timely ﬁscal
policy response, since we also show how delaying the answer to the shock in the
absence of ﬁscal rules imposes a cost in terms of lower growth levels (and thus,
lower consumption) for future generations (of course, the present generation can
beneﬁtf r o mt h i sd e l a y ) .
The main conclusion that can be obtained from this paper is that ﬁscal
sustainability can be extremely fragile in the absence of ﬁscal rules. On the
contrary, ﬁscal rules make the economic equilibrium stable and ensure that
public debt does not endanger ﬁscal sustainability. Furthermore, ﬁscal rules
allow for a timely reaction, thereby avoiding disruptive ﬁscal adjustment in the
future: the more adjustment is delayed, the larger is its necessary scale.
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This paper investigates ﬁscal sustainability in an overlapping generations econ-
omy with endogenous growth coming from human capital formation through
educational spending. In the model, the government is allowed to run bud-
getary imbalances that can lead to the emission of public debt. The objective
is to assess how budgetary imbalances aﬀect economic dynamics and the out-
look for economic growth, thereby providing a rationale for ﬁscal rules ensuring
sustainability.
T h et a xa n dt r a n s f e rs y s t e me x a m i n e di nt h i sp a p e ri sf a i r l yr i c h . P e n -
sion beneﬁts are assumed to be paid in a lump-sum manner. Individuals pay
a proportional tax on labor income and at the same time they either pay a
lump-sum tax or receive a lump-sum transfer. Labor income taxation is charac-
terized by high top marginal tax rates and relatively lower average eﬀective tax
rates, reﬂecting the progressiveness of income taxation. This is well captured in
our model by combining a proportional income tax with a lump-sum transfer.
In addition to the tax-beneﬁt system, the government ﬁnances general public
spending, which beneﬁts individuals but does not aﬀect their economic deci-
sions, and issues bonds. As individuals maximize utility and therefore react to
ﬁscal policies, the model provides a suitable framework to inquire about ﬁscal
sustainability.
There is a large and growing literature on the convenience of imposing ﬁscal
rules, as well as on their desirable properties in terms of sustainability and sta-
bilization. Fiscal rules are in general justiﬁed as a way to prevent governments
from choosing levels of taxation or government spending that do not maximize
social welfare because of political biases (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti
(1995) or Milesi-Ferretti (2004)). Political biases in ﬁscal policies can ultimately
lead to increasing debt ratios, possibly endangering ﬁscal sustainability. In dy-
namic models, where absence of control of the debt dynamics may endanger
sustainability, ﬁscal rules can help stabilize the dynamics of an economy that
would otherwise be inherently unstable and maintain the economy on a sustain-
able path.
Overlapping generations models are suitable theoretical tools to address ﬁs-
cal sustainability issues. As the Ricardian equivalence does not apply in these
models and debt dynamics are in general unstable, ﬁscal rules are needed to
maintain ﬁscal sustainability. In the classical Diamond model (Diamond (1965))
where the only source of economic growth is the accumulation of physical cap-
ital, De la Croix and Michel (2002) and Rankin and Roﬃa (2003) deﬁne and
study ﬁscal sustainability. We extend here their analysis to an endogenous
growth model in which the interest rate and the growth rate of the economy
are jointly determined. There are two sources of economic growth in our model:
the accumulation of physical capital and the formation of human capital. The
accumulation of physical capital stems from individual savings. Endogenous
growth results from the formation of human capital, which is assumed to result
from parental education and educational spending, ﬁnanced out of altruism.
The main ﬁndings are the following. First, the existence of steady states is
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is unstable, given an initial capital-labor ratio, there is a unique debt to GDP
ratio ensuring ﬁscal sustainability. Second, in the presence of multiple steady
states, the initial conditions in the economy matter for the long run equilibrium
that will result from economic dynamics. Third, the stability properties of the
economy depend on the set of ﬁscal instruments, i.e., on the adopted ﬁscal rules.
Fiscal policy rules are generally needed to ensure the stability of equilibria that
are dynamically eﬃcient. In the literature dealing with public debt, two sorts of
ﬁscal policy rules have in general been assumed1: the constant debt policy and
the constant deﬁcit policy. We will however concentrate on the former policy
(to be precise, a constant debt to GDP ratio policy), since its implementation
is much easier in our model and our main objective is to illustrate how rules
change the dynamics of the economy (see Buiter (2003) for a comparison of
suggested and currently implemented operational rules).
Not surprisingly, the set of economic equilibria and their associated dynamics
are simpler in the case of a small open economy, where the debt dynamics are
unstable if the interest rate is higher than the growth rate and stable otherwise.
Only the ﬁrst case is consistent with the assumption of a small open economy,
since the external indebtedness of the small open economy would tend to inﬁnity
in the second case (see Marín (2002)). In the absence of ﬁscal rules, we get to
the same conclusion for the case of a closed economy, that is, the debt dynamics
are unstable if the interest rate is higher than the growth rate (below the golden
rule of capital accumulation) and stable otherwise (above the golden rule).
These considerations clearly show that the appropriate response of ﬁscal
policy to exogenous temporary shocks is not trivial in the absence of ﬁscal
rules. If temporary small shocks occur in the neighborhood of a stable steady
state, there is no strong case for adjustments to ﬁscal policy, as the economy
can come back to its initial position by itself. However, when temporary shocks
occur in the neighborhood of an unstable steady state, which is the standard
case in an economy with public debt, they can alter the nature of the economic
equilibrium, possibly endangering ﬁscal sustainability. Without timely reaction
to such shocks, ensuring ﬁscal sustainability would require adjustment, possibly
of a disruptive nature, in the future: the more the adjustment is delayed, the
larger is its necessary scale. Fiscal rules preserving ﬁscal sustainability seem
more appropriate to deal with small shocks, as they timely maintain the economy
on a sustainable path and do not lead to disruptive adjustments.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the main assump-
tions of our model. In section 3, the dynamics of the state variables (human
capital, physical capital and public debt) are discussed. In section 4, we intro-
duce a simulation exercise. We parameterize a baseline version of the model and
then see what its properties are and, ﬁnally, as an illustration, how this baseline
would react to a demographic shock similar to the one the European Union is
expected to suﬀer in the next 50 years. Section 5 concludes the paper.
1In an overlapping generations model Marín (2002) and Annicchiaricco and Giammarioli
(2004) examine a ﬁscal rule whereby the primary balance is adjusted in function of the distance
between the actual and the targeted levels of the debt and primary surplus ratios.
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The basic framework is an overlapping generations model (Allais (1947), Samuel-
son (1958), Diamond (1965)), in which parents have an altruistic concern for
their children. Parents choose educational spending so as to maximize the ex-
pected net labor income of their children. They are therefore aware that the
return to education is aﬀected by labor income taxation. The tax system is
fairly rich and encompasses both proportional and lump-sum labor taxes as
well as old-age beneﬁts. We consider both the case of balanced budget policies,
whereby taxes levied on labor ﬁnance old-age beneﬁts so that the tax system
functions as a pay-as-you-go public pension scheme, and the case of public debt,
whereby the government can run budget deﬁcits or surpluses.
Education in the family is a peculiar non-market activity, which has the
following features. First, parents’ ability to educate children can diﬀer. Some
parents may be more skilled than others in educating their children, which
would result in heterogeneity in the levels of human capital of individuals be-
longing to the same cohort, even though these individuals are ex ante perfectly
identical and endowed with the same skills. Second, there is no market for
parental education. Children do not choose their parents, whereas the quality
of their education and ultimately their level of human capital depend on their
parents’ abilities to educate them. Third, parents do not know ex ante their
educational abilities, implying that they have to take educational decisions un-
der uncertainty about the relationship between their eﬀorts and their children’s
educational attainment. We model these features as a shock to the education
technology; parents are either endowed with a highly productive or a standard
education technology but they know their type only ex post. This generates
a distribution of historical growth rates of human capital that converges to a
normal distribution.
2.1 Households
The economy consists of a sequence of individuals who live for three periods:
childhood, adulthood and old-age. Each individual belongs to a family or dy-
nasty; there are I families in the economy. In the second period of their life,
each individual gives birth to 1+nt children, so that all families grow at the










where Nt denotes the number of individuals born in period t − 1.
Individuals are educated during childhood and their human capital during
adulthood mainly depends on their parents’ educational spending and on their
parents’ human capital. The education technology is stochastic, and parents
do not know ex ante whether they are endowed with a highly productive or
a baseline education technology. The education technology is a characteristic
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cording to the same technology. With probability p, parents are endowed with
a highly productive education technology and their children’s human capital,





where ε>0. et and ht are parental spending on education and parents’ human
capital, respectively, while Ft denotes an economy-wide technological progress in
the ﬁeld of education. δ ∈ (0,1) stands for the elasticity of human capital with
respect to private educational spending. Though education policies together
with individual decisions clearly aﬀect human capital formation, we do not
address this issue in this paper, where technological progress in human capital
formation is assumed to be exogenous. With probability 1−p, they are endowed





Given levels of educational spending and parental human capital, the expected





During adulthood each individual born at t−1 supplies inelastically ht eﬃciency
units of labor, receives a gross labor income wtht, pays proportional (τt)a n d
lump-sum (ηt) taxes, consumes ct,s a v e sst and spends (1+nt)et on education:
ct + st +( 1+nt)et =( 1− τt)wtht − ηt ≡ ωt (2)
where ωt stands for labor income net of taxes. When old individuals consume
the proceeds of their saving (Rt+1st), along with their pension beneﬁts (Θt+1):
dt+1 = Rt+1st + Θt+1 (3)
where dt+1 denotes old-age consumption.
We assume that individuals ﬁnance their children’s education out of altru-
ism2. They choose educational spending so as to maximize the expected net
labor income of their children. There is no bequest motive in the model. The
inclusion of bequests would allow parents to exercise their altruism in two diﬀer-
ent ways: through education or bequests. Depending on how they are modeled,
operative bequests may lead to debt neutrality and consequently to the absence
of real eﬀects of ﬁscal policy when taxes and public transfers are lump-sum
(see Lambrecht, Michel and Vidal (2001)). As our aim is to examine govern-
ment debt in a model where ﬁscal policy is eﬀective and there are risks to ﬁscal
sustainability, we assume that there are no bequests.
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function:
Ut =( 1− β)(ln(ct)+u(gt)) + β (ln(dt+1)+u(gt+1)) + γ ln(Et[ωt+1]) (4)
where 0 <β<1 is a discount factor and γ>0 is the degree of intergenerational
altruism. gt denotes the consumption of public goods in period t; as the utility is
separable, the provision of public goods does not aﬀect the ﬁrst-order conditions.
The expected net labor income of children is easily obtained from (1):





Individuals maximize (4) under their budget constraints (2)-(3) and (5). The







(1 − β)(1 + nt)
ct
=







Equation (6) determines consumptions over the life-cycle: the marginal rate
of substitution between adult and old-age consumption is equal to the rate of
interest. Equation (7) determines parental educational choices. The utility loss
in terms of reduced consumption of spending one euro on children’s education
is equal to the utility gain stemming from the increase in children’s expected









where Wt denotes life-cycle disposable income.
Regarding lump-sum taxes and pension beneﬁts, we further assume that the
tax-beneﬁt system does not operate any redistribution across income classes.
The tax system is focused on intergenerational redistribution and lump-sum
taxes and beneﬁts are therefore related to an individual’s labor income class so
that there is no intra-generational redistribution across income classes:
ηt =˜ ηtwtht (9)
Θt+1 = θt+1wtht
Life-cycle disposable income is therefore given by:
Wt =
µ




wtht =( 1− Tt)wtht (10)
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tax rate is positive if the rate of interest is higher than the implicit rate of return
of public pensions: Rt+1 >
θt+1
τt+e ηt.
Combining the life-cycle budget constraint (8) with condition (6), we can
write:
ct =( 1− β)(Wt − (1 + nt)et)
dt+1 = βRt+1 (Wt − (1 + nt)et)
Plugging the expression for ct into condition (7), we obtain an equation
characterizing the optimal choice of educational spending:
(et)δ−
γδ
(1 + nt)(1 + γδ)
Wt(et)δ−1 =
ηt+1
(1 + γδ)(1 − τt+1)(1 + pε)Ft(ht)1−δ (11)
Together with (9), equation (11) gives the optimal education spending:
et =
γδ(1 − τt+1)










(1 + nt)(1 − τt+1 − ˜ ηt+1 + γδ(1 − τt+1))
(12)




1 − τt+1 − ˜ ηt+1
¢





1 − τt+1 − ˜ ηt+1
¢




= σt (Rt+1)wt (15)















Working Paper Series No. 395
October 20042.2 Firms
In each period t, production occurs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology





where Kt and Ht denote the levels of physical and human capital in period t,
respectively. At is a technology parameter, indicating exogenous technological
progress over time, and α ∈ (0,1) is the share of physical capital.
The stock of capital in period t (Kt) comes from the total savings of the
preceding period, public or private. The demand for labor (eﬀective labor or
human capital) maximizes proﬁts:








The resulting wage is the competitive one:




The remaining proﬁts belong to capital owners so that we can deﬁne the










In each period, the government levies labor income taxes and pays pension





the outstanding public debt Bt−1 along with the accrued interests (Rt − 1)Bt−1
and issues government bonds Bt, which will be redeemed one period later. In
period t, the government budget constraint is:











The relevant statistical concept for public debt in the model at hand is net
debt, i.e. the diﬀerence between general government’s liabilities and assets. We
have already assumed that the lump-sum taxes and beneﬁts are related to labor
income when setting up the households’ budget constraint. We do not consider
the case of income redistribution across families, and focus on intergenerational
redistribution by means of pay-as-you-go public pension and public debt. Under
this assumption, we have:
Bt = RtBt−1 + θtwt−1Ht−1 − (˜ ηt + τt)wtHt + Gt (19)
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3.1 The economic growth rate
U pt on o ww eh a v eo f t e no m i t t e ds u p e r s c r i p ti. Each family is characterized
by a history of shocks aﬀecting the education technology of each successive
generation. Some generations in a given family are more successful than others



















t = ε>0 with probability p and e ε
i
t =0with probability 1 − p.
After T periods, we can calculate the expected level of human capital of a
member of family i, whose ancestor had a level of human capital hi
t in period t.



















t+T with j =0 ,...,T represents the T +1possible diﬀerent histories
of shocks in T periods. h0
t+T is the human capital resulting from a history,
according to which the family never beneﬁted from a positive shock in T periods.
h
j
t+T denotes the human capital of the descendant of a family that received j
good shocks.











(1 + nt)(1 − τt+1 − ˜ ηt+1 + γδ(1 − τt+1))

























Assuming either that all the exogenous parameters and prices are constant
over time, which would be the case of a small open economy, or else that prices
have converged to their steady-state levels in the closed economy case, we can
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Φ(w,R)(1+pε)−1 is the expected average annual growth rate of human capital
in family i. It will also be the average growth rate of the economy.
Labor supply in period t is equal to the aggregate level of human capital
in the economy. The aggregation of the levels of human capital of the Nt(= PI
i=1 Ni







Let us now turn to the dynamics of aggregate human capital. Using (21) we


















t is the realization of the shock aﬀecting family i. Let us now calculate













Et (Ht+1)=( 1+pε)(1 + nt)Φt (wt,R t+1)Ht (23)
If the number of families I is large enough, aggregate human capital will be
equal to its expectation at time t: Ht+1 = Et (Ht+1). The growth rate of per
capita human capital, which will also be the growth rate of per capita variables
















3.2 Physical capital and public debt
Savings ﬁnance both physical capital and public debt, so that the following
capital market clearing condition holds:
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t = σt (Rt+1)wtHt (24)
The intertemporal equilibrium in this economy can thus be deﬁned as a
sequence {Kt+1,B t+1}
∞
t=0 satisfying the following equations:
Kt+1 + Bt = σt (Rt+1)wtHt
Bt+1 = Rt+1Bt + θt+1wtHt −
¡
˜ ηt+1 + τt+1
¢
wt+1Ht+1 + Gt+1
Knowing that the evolution of aggregate human capital is governed by (23),
the dynamics of the economy can be summarized by a system of two equations
expressed in intensive terms:
kt+1 =
σt (Rt+1)wt − bt




(1 + pε)(1 + nt)Φt (wt,R t+1)
−
¡
˜ ηt+1 + τt+1
¢
wt+1 + gt+1 (26)
where kt = Kt/Ht, bt = Bt/Ht and gt = Gt/Ht are the ratio of physical to
human capital, the ratio of public debt to human capital and public consumption
per unit of human capital in period t, respectively.
It is well known that there are normally two steady state solutions when
we introduce public debt in a standard overlapping generations economy. In
the case of an endogenous growth model as the one presented here, there is no
simple analytical expression for the solutions but the simulation below can help
understand the functioning of the system. However, the analytical solution can
be computed if we assume balanced budgets in every period and no government
spending.
4 Simulations
In this section, we produce a rough calibration of the model with the objective
of providing some examples about how ﬁscal sustainability can be guaranteed
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fd i v e r s es h o c k s .T h ew a yt op r o c e e di sﬁrst the calibration of a
baseline scenario whose response to the mentioned shocks will then be assessed.
4.1 Baseline scenario
The calibration of 2 or 3-period overlapping generations economies is not very
usual in the literature. The main diﬃculty in dealing with this issue is the
need to simulate very long time periods. In the current example, we follow De
16
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a typical individual lives for 90 years. During the ﬁrst 30 years (childhood),
she just receives education; she works, consumes and saves during the following
30 years (adulthood); and, ﬁnally, she lives out of her retirement pension and
savings for the last 30 years (retirement). This description is quite crude but
the objective at this point is just to explain how such an economy would work
without of course claiming that this is what actually happens in reality.
4.1.1 Macroeconomic assumptions
The macroeconomic assumptions refer to the choice of the parameters that en-
sure reasonable interest and growth rates in the baseline scenario. Of course, the
ﬁnal interest and growth rates depend also on the public ﬁnance assumptions.
The main parameters of the model with their chosen values are shown in the
following table:
β =0 .4252 Equivalent to a yearly discount rate of 0.99
γ =0 .169 From De la Croix and Doepke (2004)
δ =0 .6 From De la Croix and Doepke (2003)
ε =0 .1 Arbitrary
p =0 .5 Arbitrary; rapid convergence to Normal distribution
α =0 .3 Standard range in the literature
For the particular choice of utility function selected in this model, β repre-
sents the weight of old age consumption in the utility of each individual. The
value chosen is equivalent to a yearly discount factor of 0.99. This is higher than
the usual estimate of 0.96 more frequently used in the literature. The qualita-
tive conclusions of the model are the same with both values but this higher β
allows us to produce more reasonable interest rates. γ is an important parame-
ter in this model since it represents the degree of altruism that ultimately leads
parents to worry about their children education. The value of 0.169 is taken
from De la Croix and Doepke (2004). They give an alternative value of 0.271
in De la Croix and Doepke (2003) but the ﬁrst one is preferred for the same
reasons expressed in the choice of β. The same source is used for the choice of
0.6 as the value for δ, the elasticity of human capital with respect to educational
spending. The value of the capital share (α =0 .3) is taken in the usual range
employed in the literature. The values chosen for the technology parameters A
and F, which are just scale parameters, are respectively 50 and 1. Finally, the
values for ε and p are taken arbitrarily. They aﬀect the shape of the distribution
of human capital and their eﬀect on the aggregate behavior is identical to that
of Ft. ε =0 .1 means that productive human capital producers are 10% more
eﬀective than the rest whereas p =0 .5 is chosen so that the distribution of
historical family growth rates approaches a normal distribution more quickly.
The population growth rate assumed is of 0.34% per year. This last number
represents the European Union population growth during the 90’s (EUROSTAT
2002 Yearbook). This population growth and technology parameters, together
17
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1.85% per year and a yearly long-term interest rate of 4.73%.
4.1.2 Public ﬁnance assumptions
The baseline scenario is calibrated for a case in which the budget is balanced
every period and there is no net public debt. By zero net public debt, we mean
that the government is neither a net lender to, nor a net borrower from, the
other sectors of the economy. This does not mean that the government has
zero liabilities but that government liabilities are equal to government assets.
A l t h o u g hn e tg o v e r n m e n td e b ti st h er e l e v a n tc o n c e p ti nt h em o d e la th a n d ,
it departs from the statistical deﬁnition of general government gross debt as
the consolidated liabilities of the ESA 95 general government sector. The other
ﬁscal policy parameters have been set as follows:
τ =0 .6 Marginal tax rate
˜ η = −0.2 Consistent with an eﬀective tax rate on labor income of 40%
θ =0 .2196 Consistent with a pension expenditure ratio over GDP of 8%
g =1 7 .6228 Consistent with public consumption of 20% of GDP
The marginal tax rate on labor income (τ) and the lump-sum tax/transfer
(˜ η)h a v eb e e nc h o s e nw i t hav i e wt or e p l i c a t i n gb o t ht h ee ﬀective tax rate and
the high marginal tax wedge on labor income in the European Union. The
marginal tax rate set at 60% (τ =0 .6) captures the high marginal tax wedge
on labor income in the European Union, where progressiveness in the statutory
tax rates on personal income is moderated by a wide range of tax allowances
and tax credits and the proportionality of social contributions (Joumard, 2002).
Martinez-Mongay (2000) indicates that the eﬀective tax burden on labor in the
euro area was close to 40% in 1999, slightly higher than the eﬀective tax burden
in the European Union. These estimates are corroborated by those calculated
by Mendoza et al. (1994) for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The diﬀerence between the European Union and the euro area is attributable
to the low eﬀective tax rate on labor in the United Kingdom (about 25%). The
choice of the lump-sum transfer (˜ η = −0.2) is driven by the estimates for the
eﬀective tax burden on labor (τ+˜ η =0 .4). Alternatively, this calibration can be
justiﬁed by the fact that taxes (13%) plus social contributions (15%) represent
28% of the GDP of the European Union for the period 1995-2000 (EUROSTAT
2002 Yearbook). Knowing this and given the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
production function, we can calculate:
0.28Yt =( ˜ ηt + τt)wtHt =( ˜ ηt + τt)(1− α)Yt




As for the pension parameter (θ =0 .2196), its value has been generated
endogenously from the choice of all the rest of parameters, which have been
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the actual number for the European Union in 2000. Under budget balance, we
have:
θtwt−1Ht−1 =( ˜ ηt + τt)wtHt − Gt




(˜ ηt + τt)wtHt − Gt
Yt




=0 .28 − 0.2=0 .08
Finally, g =1 7 .6228 is chosen so as to ﬁx Gt
Yt =0 .2,w h i c hi st h ev a l u e
of government consumption expenditure in the European Union in the period
1995-2000.
In an alternative scenario, choosing β =0 .2308 (0.96 yearly discount rate),
γ =0 .271 and α =1 /3,a n dw i t hﬁscal policy parameters ˜ η = −0.18 and
θ =0 .2360 (which ensure again that the pension expenditure ratio over GDP
is 8%), we generate a per capita output growth of 1.93% per year and a yearly
interest rate of 7.88%.
Calibrating a two or three period overlapping generations model is a deli-
cate exercise: the limited number of parameters leaves relatively little room for
maneuver, possibly making the baseline calibration highly sensitive to change in
assumptions. The sensitivity of our baseline calibration to changes in parame-
ters can be observed in the following table, in which only one parameter diﬀers
from the baseline scenario in each variant:
Growth Rate Interest Rate Debt ratio Pension Expenditure
Baseline 1.85% 4.73% 0% 8%
β =0 .4 1.80% 4.90% -0.01% 8.12%
β =0 .45 1.90% 4.57% 0.11% 7.89%
γ =0 .15 1.70% 4.49% -0.36% 8.38%
γ =0 .2 2.07% 5.06% 0.44% 7.50%
α =0 .25 1.75% 4.18% 1.39% 8.84%
α =1 /3 1.92% 5.12% -0.63% 7.47%
ε =0 .05 1.80% 4.65% -0.13% 8.14%
ε =0 .2 1.97% 4.88% 0.24% 7.74%
p =0 .25 1.80% 4.65% -0.13% 8.14%
p =0 .75 1.91% 4.80% 0.12% 7.87%
˜ η = −0.18 1.78% 4.99% 0.93% 8.19%
˜ η = −0.22 1.95% 4.42% -1.39% 7.79%
θ =0 .2 1.82% 4.78% 0.57% 7.35%
θ =0 .2360 1.88% 4.68% -0.51% 8.53%
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The existence and characterization of steady states depend critically on the
assumptions about the ﬁscal policy that the government is implementing.
F i r s to fa l l ,l e tu sa s s u m et h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n tﬁxes taxes and pension ben-
eﬁts, as well as government consumption as a fraction of GDP and lets the
economy work by itself. The dynamics of such an economy would be governed
by the following dynamic system:
kt+1 =
σt (wt,R t+1) − bt
(1 + pε)(1 + nt)Φt (wt,R t+1)
bt+1 =
Rt+1bt + θt+1wt
(1 + pε)(1 + nt)Φt (wt,R t+1)
−
¡
˜ ηt+1 + τt+1
¢
wt+1 + gt+1
The ﬁrst question is whether or not such an economy will converge to some
steady state. To study this, we can ﬁx all the parameters and assume kt+1 =
kt = k and bt+1 = bt = b.A f t e rs o l v i n gf o rb in the second equation, we obtain
a single non linear equation in k. The representation of such an equation is
shown in ﬁgure 1.
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Intensive capital




The intersection of the dash line and the x-axis represents the set of steady
states for the baseline calibration. There are two steady states resulting from
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cially depends on ﬁscal policy. For example, increasing government consumption
from 20% to 25% of GDP is suﬃcient to disrupt the long-term economic equi-
librium, as it can be seen on ﬁgure 1. Similar results can stem from excessive
public expenditure ratios and either excessive or insuﬃcient taxation. With our
speciﬁcation of the economy, steady states are multiple (two), unless they do not
exist, except for the special case of a tangency solution. From these two steady
states, the ﬁrst one is associated with dynamic eﬃciency (under-accumulation
of capital), while the second is in general in the area of dynamic ineﬃciency.
The dynamics of the system can better be observed in the following phase
diagram, which corresponds to the baseline calibration (see ﬁgure 2). First, the
two steady states identiﬁed by ﬁgure 1 are located at the intersection of the
curves kt+1 = kt and bt+1 = bt. Second, we can observe what is the associated
net debt to GDP ratio for each of the two steady states: zero for the ﬁrst steady
state (it was calibrated for this to be the case) and a net lending position of
19.89% of GDP for the second one.
 


















It can be seen from the diagram that the ﬁrst steady state is unstable.
This means that, for any initial intensive capital value, there is only one debt
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under-accumulation of capital. This steady state would be stable in the saddle
path sense, with a saddle path slightly decreasing in the net debt ratio in the
proximity of the steady state. Debt, however, is a stock variable and there is
no mechanism in this economy that can set the debt ratio in the saddle path
so that a small perturbation will lead the economy to diverge from the steady
state. We can notice that if the perturbation leads to a debt level below the
saddle path, the economy, evolving according to its own laws of motion, will
converge to the second steady state. However, if the perturbation leads to a
higher debt level, the economy will inexorably diverge to reach a 0 capital level,
unless some kind of discretionary ﬁscal policy is adopted or new countervailing
shocks happen.
As for the second steady state, it is situated to the right of the golden rule
intensive capital level. The golden rule intensive capital level is deﬁned as the
solution to the equation:
R =( 1+n)(1+ρ)=( 1+pε)(1 + n)Φ(w,R)
For the baseline calibration, this value is 14.5925, which is lower than the
second steady state, situated at a level of intensive capital of 15.8052.A tt h i s
steady state, thus, the economy is in an area of dynamic ineﬃciency, as deﬁned
in Cass (1965). The growth rate of the economy (in per capita terms) at this
steady state is 2.53% per year with a yearly real interest rate of 2.62%. The
pension expenditure ratio is now reduced to 6.57% of GDP.
Why do we not consider so carefully this stable steady state? The reason,
in addition to the fact that it is associated to an unusually high net lending
position of general government, is the number of studies that have established
how extraordinary is that an economy is in a dynamically ineﬃcient steady
state (Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)). It must be noticed, though, that this
steady state is robust to small perturbations. Even more, it can be said that
once the economy is in this steady state, an unreasonably big shock is required
to endanger ﬁscal sustainability. Another justiﬁcation for not concentrating
on the study of the over-accumulation steady state could be based on political
economy arguments. Once governments start running budget surpluses, it is
very unlikely that they will keep the same budget policy instead of spending
their extra resources. A good example of this can be found in the United States
debate about what to do with the ﬁscal surplus at the end of the 90’s.
Coming back to the ﬁrst steady state, theory tells us that if the initial
conditions of the economy are such that we start from the ﬁrst steady state, the
economy should remain there forever. However, we claim that this steady state
is inherently unstable, making ﬁscal sustainability very fragile. Suppose that
the economy situates itself with a slightly higher debt to GDP ratio than that
implied by the steady state. An example can be seen in ﬁgure 3. The initial
conditions are set at the under-accumulation steady state plus some arbitrary
small amount of additional government liabilities (0.1% of GDP). Such a small
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perturbation (we can make it arbitrarily small) is suﬃcient to disequilibrate the
system. If the same ﬁscal parameters are nevertheless kept, public debt starts
to accumulate, very slightly in the ﬁrst periods but at an increasing rhythm. In
this example, the economy would crash at the eighth period. Remember that
this is a discrete time model so that we have jumps in the phase diagram; the
jump after the seventh period would lead us to negative capital levels, that is,
a collapse of the economy.
It could be argued that this should not be a major concern since eight periods
in this model represent actually 240 years. It is true that it is very extreme to
assume that nothing else would change in 240 years, although some civilization
may have collapsed out of ﬁscal problems in such a time span. However, the best
way to reconcile this model with the behavior of real economies is to think that
the economy is never in steady state and that the phase diagram is continuously
changing, as the long-run steady state also depends on ﬁscal policy decisions.
In this case, ﬁscal sustainability can be a more delicate issue than the previous
numerical analysis would suggest, since the instability of the system greatly
multiplies when the economy is far from the steady state.
Is there any way to limit this intrinsic instability of the ﬁrst steady state?
The government can proceed in two diﬀerent ways in this setup. One solution
is to adopt discretionary policies. For example, the pension system can be
extremely generous during one generation putting the economy in an explosive
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new steady state.
A more systematic solution would come from adopting a ﬁscal rule. The
adoption of a ﬁscal rule changes the dynamics of the system. The ﬁscal rule that
will be considered in this paper is that of a ﬁxed net debt policy. Suppose then
that the government ﬁxes a desired net debt ratio and adjusts its ﬁscal policy
instruments. In the ensuing simulations, we will keep ﬁxed the tax parameters
and will use either the pension beneﬁts (θt) or government consumption (Gt)
as equilibrating variables. In either case, the dynamics of the system will be
described by ﬁgure 4, which has been drawn for the case in which the targeted
net debt ratio is 0 (budget balance). The steady state is unique here and it
is globally stable, as we know is the case in general whenever we have budget
balance. We obtain the same result for all feasible debt ratios. The set of feasible
objective debt ratios under a ﬁxed debt policy and their associated intensive
capital values are depicted in ﬁgure 5. Any policy aiming at sustaining a debt
level over the depicted line would lead the economy to a negative capital stock
or, in other words, would not be sustainable.
 


















There are of course intermediate solutions between the two extremes of keep-
ing the same ﬁscal structure (ﬁgure 3) or adopting a ﬁscal rule (ﬁgure 4 or 5).
On the theory side (see for example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)), ﬁscal
rules usually set the tax revenue as an increasing function of government liabili-
ties. The adjustment speed of this function to some target levels is then chosen
by the government so as to minimize some kind of loss function or, equivalently,
to maximize national welfare. Studying optimal ﬁscal policy or even the opti-
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Dynamics of different fixed debt policies
Figure 5:
policy scenarios can be appreciated through the following experiment. Take the
example of ﬁgure 3 in which the economy starts from the steady state capital
level but with a small amount of public debt equivalent to 0.1% of GDP. Now
suppose that instead of not reacting to the ﬁscal crisis, the government decides
to revert to a ﬁscal rule (one implying zero debt in this case) at some point in
time. Figure 6 shows what the eﬀects of this policy on the average utility3 level
in the economy depending on when the government decides to recourse to the
ﬁscal rule. The costs of delaying the response to ﬁscal problems are reﬂected
in a high cost of ﬁscal stabilization during the period in which the economy
reverts to the rule and in the fact that the economy settles in a lower path of
growth after stabilization than the one that would have been attained if the
stabilization policy had been undertaken in time.
In this experiment, the way in which ﬁscal stabilization is obtained is by
reducing the level of public expenditure so as to go back to a level of zero
public debt. As a result, an indirect measure of the cost of ﬁscal stabilization
at diﬀerent points in time is given by the reduction of the percentage of public
expenditure over GDP that has to be given up in order to achieve it at diﬀerent
points in time. For example, suppose that the government decides to "stabilize"
after period 1 in which the level of public debt has been of 0.1% of GDP. In that
case, public expenditure needs to go from 20% of GDP to 19.77% in period 2
(it immediately goes back to 20% again in period 3 once the stabilization has
been obtained). If "stabilization" took place after period 2, public expenditure
3Average utility is obtained by assuming that u(gt)=l n ( gt) so that the total utility of
any given individual would be:
Ut =( 1− β)(ln(ct)+l n( gt)) + β (ln(dt+1)+l n( gt+1)) + γ ln(Et[ωt+1])
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the number would be 18.80% of GDP. After period 4, we would need to reduce
public expenditure to 17.14% of GDP. After 5, the reduction would have to
go till 12.36% of GDP. Finally, for "stabilization" to take place after period 6,
a negative ratio of public expenditure to GDP would be required of -11.84%
of GDP, which amounts to say that going back to a zero public debt level in
one period would be impossible just by reducing the level of public expenditure
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Stabilization after period 2
Stabilization after period 3
Stabilization after period 4
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Figure 6:
Another way of stabilizing would be to choose a diﬀerent target level after
the shock takes place. Continuing with the previous example, one possibility
would be to target a new debt level once the shock takes place. Suppose that
the government decides to stabilize at a level of 0.1% debt over GDP once the
shock takes place. In the end, this is a matter of intergenerational redistribution.
The brunt of the cost will come in the period in which stabilization is decided.
Setting a higher debt target would imply a lower capital steady state that would
be reﬂected in lower growth rates and lower utility for the rest of the periods.
4.2 Fiscal sustainability and ﬁscal consolidation
In this part, we present one example of how ﬁscal sustainability can be aﬀected
by changes in some of the parameters that we have considered exogenous. The
issue of ﬁscal sustainability has become increasingly popular in Europe in rela-
tion with the possibility or impossibility of keeping unchanged the public pension
arrangements in view of the estimates of population decrease over the next 50
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case.
4.2.1 Demographic shock
The demographic shock consists of a change in the population growth rate. The
EPC-Budgetary challenges posed by population ageing projects (page 12) that
the total population of the European Union (before enlargement) will go from
376.4 million in 2000 to 364.2 million in 2050. This gives us a yearly population
decrease of 0.07% per year that we must compare to the yearly population
growth of 0.34% assumed in the baseline scenario. The way we introduce the
shock is by assuming that -0.07% will be the generation growth rate after two
periods (in the new steady state), that is: nt+2 =( 1− 0.0007)
30. The transition




50 times that of the baseline4.
In principle, we can just compare the new dynamic system that is generated
when we apply the shock without changing any of the policy parameters. This
is done in ﬁgure 7. In ﬁgure 8, we focus on the dynamically eﬃcient steady
state. We can see that the new steady state is characterized by higher intensive
capital level and a net government debt of (-0.27%). The per capita growth
rate associated with the new steady state would be 2.15% (compare to 1.85%
in the baseline) and the interest rate 4.57% (compare to 4.73%). Keeping the
same policy parameters, the pension expenditure ratio would increase to 8.28%
of GDP (0.28% of GDP higher than the baseline).
The reason why the new steady state features higher growth comes from the
structure of the model. Growth is generated here by the investment in human
capital. A lower population growth rate allows each parent to invest more on
each of the remaining children so that they will have a higher per capita human
capital that will show up as a general higher growth rate in all the relevant
variables in the economy.
Importantly, it is misleading and dangerous to compare directly two steady
states. By looking at ﬁgure 8, we can realize that the economy would not go
to the new steady state. In fact we can run a simulation to see what would
happen if policy parameters remain unchanged. The result can be seen in ﬁgure
9, illustrating how the economy would crash ﬁve periods after the population
shock happens under no policy changes.
It could be of interest seeing the evolution of some signiﬁcant variables in
the economy along the dynamic path. This can be observed in ﬁgures 10, 11, 12
and 13. It is remarkable that the eﬀect on the interest and growth rate is not
really alarming at any point and it is very diﬃcult to deduce from it that the
economy is heading to a disaster. In this respect, neither growth nor interest
rates seems to be useful indicators of ﬁscal sustainability by themselves.
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Figure 13:
The picture is diﬀerent if we concentrate on other variables. For example,
the behavior of debt and deﬁcit is clearly explosive (ﬁgure 11). Figure 12 shows
that the main ratios in the economy: consumption to GDP (around 62.7% in
the baseline), savings to GDP (14.4% in the baseline) and private education
to GDP (2.9%), also react importantly to the demographic shock. Finally, the
ratio of pension expenditure to GDP also increases along the dynamics caused
by the shock (ﬁgure 13).
We discussed in the previous section that ﬁscal rules could prevent the econ-
omy from entering in unsustainable dynamics. In this case, we will ﬁrst analyze
what is the eﬀect of adopting a ﬁscal rule of budget balance (zero net debt).
When we want to impose budget balance or any other ﬁxed debt policy, we can
use either government consumption or pension beneﬁts as equilibrating vari-
ables. If we use the latter (pension reform), most of the relevant variables in the
economy stay unchanged (the ratios presented in the previous charts). There
are of course repercussions on the growth rate per capita and interest rate that
can be observed in ﬁgure 14.
The change in the pension beneﬁts does not aﬀect the pension expenditure
to GDP ratio, but it is nevertheless interesting to know by how much pension
beneﬁts have to decrease to attain budget balance. This calculation is presented
4We elevate to the power of 60 because we take two complete 30-year periods.
Effects of the demographic shock on pension expenditure over GDP
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Effect of the demographic shock under budget balance
Period after the shock
Growth rate per capita
Interest rate
Figure 14:
in ﬁgure 15. Beneﬁts can remain unchanged for the ﬁrst period but must be
reduced by more than 8% in the following one. Once the economy stabilizes in
the new steady state, beneﬁts can be upgraded slightly but would remain 4%
below their original level in spite of the higher growth rate associated to the
new steady state.
Another possibility for the government to ensure budget balance is to reduce
government consumption, while maintaining pension beneﬁts. The eﬀect is
exactly the same that was observed in ﬁgure 14 for the interest and growth rate
per capita. However, the reaction of other macroeconomic variables is diﬀerent,
as it can be seen in ﬁgures 16 and 17. Figure 16 shows that the consumption to
GDP ratio increases 0.6% in the new steady state with respect to the baseline,
whereas the savings ratio goes down by some 0.5% of GDP with respect to
the baseline and educational spending with respect to GDP also increases by
0.28% with respect to the baseline. In ﬁgure 17, we can see how the pension
expenditure to GDP ratio evolves when we keep beneﬁts unchanged. It increases
by 3.9% of GDP with respect to the baseline in the new steady state. Finally, the
necessary reaction of the government consumption to equilibrate the economy
implies a decrease by 1.6% of GDP with respect to the baseline.
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Evolution of social security benefits after the shock to equilibrate the budget
Figure 15:
 








Effect of the demographic shock under budget balance
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Effect of the demographic shock under budget balance
Pension expenditure as a fraction of GDP
Public expenditure as a fraction of GDP
Figure 17:
4.3 Inequality
Before concluding the paper, some comments must be made about the distri-
butional results of the model. These results are completely analogous to those
obtained by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and by De la Croix and Doepke
(2003 and 2004). This is why we will not comment very extensively on them.
In ﬁgures 18, 19 and 20, we can see the evolution of the distribution of
normalized (divided by the mean) levels of human capital. Even if everybody
starts from the same level of human capital, the assumed law of motion of
human capital increases the heterogeneity of the population in every period.
Figure 18 shows the distribution after the ﬁrst period. Figure 19 presents the
distribution after 100 periods and ﬁgure 20 shows how the distribution converges
to a lognormal distribution after 200 periods. Finally, we can see how inequality
increases over time in the evolution of the coeﬃcient of variation (ﬁgure 21).
We can do the same analysis with respect to the evolution of family growth
rates of human capital. As above, ﬁgure 22 shows the distribution of growth
rates of human capital after the ﬁrst period. Figure 23 shows the same dis-
tribution after 100 periods and, ﬁnally, ﬁgure 24 presents how the distribution
of family growth rates of human capital converges to a normal distribution.
However, contrary to the inequality in levels of human capital, the inequality
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in family growth rates of human capital (measured again as the coeﬃcient of
variation) decreases with time, as it can be seen in ﬁgure 25.
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The objective of this paper was to analyze ﬁscal sustainability in an overlap-
ping generations economy in which government imbalances are allowed. The
conclusions that can be drawn from this study are the following.
First, it is not suﬃcient to concentrate on steady state analysis. Fiscal policy
is sustainable if the economic equilibrium exists in all periods. This is a general
obvious point that we want to remark here because of its particular relevance
in this model. For example, in the demographic shock studied in this paper, it
is clear that the new steady state is characterized by higher growth rates and
lower interest rates than the one before the shock. However, the economy, let
to its own dynamics without any change in ﬁscal policy, would never attain the
new more favorable steady state but would instead be led to an unsustainable
situation.
Second, it must be emphasized that ﬁscal sustainability can be extremely
fragile. All the indicators in an economy may remain at "normal" levels, while
the economy is actually in an unsustainable situation.
Third, ﬁscal policy rules seem to be necessary to ensure ﬁscal sustainability.
The government cannot remain passive in front of the shocks that aﬀect the
economy but it must react to those shocks in a way that situates the economy
on sustainable paths. Under ﬁscal rules, such as a constant debt policy in
the framework developed in this paper, the dynamic properties of the economy
change and the equilibrium becomes stable under "normal" shocks.
These are the main conclusions that can be drawn from such a study of
ﬁscal sustainability. It would be interesting, as a direction for future research,
to check the robustness of these conclusions to diﬀerent time structures, which
would also ease the calibration of the model. Finally, the modeled economy is
rich enough as to assess the optimality of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies.
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